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The Marginal Man
by Max Pensky
In a line from The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt dismissed the signi cance of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, indirectly, the Genocide Convention as well. These
new, highly normative instruments of international law, Arendt wrote:
… were sponsored by marginal gures—by a few international
jurists without political experience or professional
philanthropists supported by the uncertain sentiments of
professional idealists. The groups they formed, the declarations
they issued show an uncanny similarity in language and
composition to that of societies for the prevention of cruelty to
animals. No statesman, no political gure of any importance
could possibly take them seriously…1
In her chapter on Arendt and Lemkin,2 political theorist Seyla Benhabib offers Arendt’s
quote to document both Arendt’s deep initial skepticism regarding the power of international
law to exert meaningful effects on the new constellation of mass political movements of the 20th
century. Among the “marginal gures” that Arendt scorns is almost certainly Raphaël Lemkin,
who in all likelihood Arendt had never met, even though their geographical and personal
spheres overlapped considerably.
Douglas Irvin-Erickson also offers this quote toward the end of his ne intellectual
biography, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide. As the biography of a concept and a
historical constellation, and not just a man, Irvin-Erickson’s book joins the ranks of recent
studies exploring the remarkably speci c origins of the universalist norms that transformed
international law in the decades before, during and after the Second World War and the
Holocaust. These studies, including Benhabib’s recent work,3 Philippe Sands’ East-West Street:
On the Origins of “Genocide” and “Crimes Against Humanity”4 that explores the relation between
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neighbors and eventual adversaries Lemkin and Hersch Lauterpacht, and James Loef er’s
Rooted Cosmopolitans: Jews and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century,5 have provided us with
rich, concrete accounts of a small group of Jewish legal theorists and jurists, rooted in the
shifting and violent political universe of eastern Europe, in what was, alternately, East Prussia,
Poland, and Ukraine. Their experiences of marginalization and persecution, of cultural and
physical vulnerability under capricious political authority, and ultimately of the destruction of
their families and their world, appropriated the concepts and mechanisms of international law
with the goal of transforming a collection of treaties and customs, largely designed to lubricate
international commerce, into a demand for the protection of individuals from obliteration by
their own political authorities.
Better than any previous biography, Irvin-Erickson’s book is clear, adept and engaging
in reconstructing the political bargaining that, bit by bit, produced the text of the Genocide
Convention; a document that, depending on one’s point of view, is a singular leap forward in
the power and purpose of international law, a deeply problematic betrayal of Lemkin’s
motivation vision, or, most likely, a messy combination of both.
The post-Convention life of the genocide concept, as a result, has always been
peculiarly two-faced. A “narrow” legal de nition often appears so narrow as to be nearly
useless as the powerful legal response to state targeting of vulnerable groups, as we see most
evidently in the lofty evidentiary bar for special intent that the International Court of Justice
now sees as settled law, or the claim that China’s campaign to eradicate the Uighurs as a distinct
ethnic, national and religious group, lacking only the direct evidence of mass killing, does not
meet the legal threshold of genocide.
At the same time as this steady winnowing down of the reach and relevance of the legal
construct, of course, once the concept of genocide broke from its narrow legal channels, it
became so mainstreamed and broadened that it is now available to condemn and justify
everything from unprovoked attacks on Thanksgiving turkeys to national defense against
Russian paramilitaries in Donbas. What is increasingly hard to locate in this bipolar
development is precisely the sane and motivating middle ground, the promise of law as both
expression and enforcement of a global consensus that demands enforceable limits on state
power, that motivated both Lemkin and the rest of his cohort in the rst place.
Why did this happen? One low-hanging explanation is that Lemkin, like others, was
simply overcon dent in what law, and especially international law, could accomplish as the
“gentle civilizer of nations,” as Martti Kosenniemi6 put it in a classic study. Irvin-Erickson’s
detailed history of the concept of genocide makes this easy explanation harder, fortunately. The
legal route toward a global norm restraining sovereign attacks against a state’s own domestic
population never lost sight of the fact that norms, whether legal, moral, or otherwise, only exert
an effect on would-be perpetrators of atrocity crimes if the norm succeeds in catalyzing an
international political shift of values, priorities, and interests strong enough to change potential
genocidaire’s calculations of cost and bene t. For that, a new legal regime would need to be met
halfway, so to speak, by corresponding normative and institutional changes in international
politics. For a brief window stretching from the beginning of the 1990s to roughly the end of the
rst decade of the 2000s, that change seemed, with many reservations, to be taking place. For
many observers, it is now in full retreat.
Thus, while it is tempting to lay at least a part of the blame for the erosion of this lawdriven constellation of international atrocity prevention on the marginalization, the legalism,
and the insuf cient intimacy with the demands of Realpolitik characteristic of the founding
generation (those “few international jurists without political experience or professional
philanthropists supported by the uncertain sentiments of professional idealists,” as Arendt
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dismissively wrote), it is a temptation worth resisting, or at least seriously qualifying. As a
marginal gure, Lemkin was also marginalized from the kind of political engagement that
would no doubt have proven useful once his plan for legal protection of vulnerable groups had
to go through the sausage factory of international political bargaining. Irvin-Erickson’s book is
at its most informative and poignant as it reconstructs Lemkin’s gradual abandonment, through
a series of sometimes questionable compromises of what is arguably the core innovation of his
own conception of genocide: the recognition of state efforts to eradicate the cultural foundations
of national groups as a distinctive crime, regularly perpetrated, with catastrophic results, but
utterly excluded from domestic criminal legal systems due to the peculiarities of state
sovereignty.
Would Lemkin have had more success in preserving more of the most valuable
elements of his own conception of genocide if he had had more experience, stature, and access
(and, to be honest, native talent) as a political negotiator? Very possibly. But his very
marginality, as the book documents, actually had much to do with the impressive success that
Lemkin did in fact achieve. An international jurist from a small patch of hinterland lying
somewhere on the shifting border between Poland and Ukraine turned out to be perfectly
positioned to catalyze this most complex and contested of concepts. Change can be expected
from the margins most of all. And as the global community of genocide prevention practitioners
works to preserve what it can of the power of that concept, it is likely that similarly
marginalized actors, perhaps more than important political gures, will take the lead.
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